Well apparently the new e-passports that were supposedly so good have already been hacked, furthermore with minimal equipment and within an hour.

Kind of ignorant to think about something as simple as that as secure.

The Public Key Directory sounds like a decent way to make it more secure.

Personally my idea is that every e-passport needs more hardware.  Hardware that stores data, preferably in a rotating array like RSA SecurIDs, and would better yet have another mechanism which would never transmit the internal rotating IDs but rather would transmit a hashed ID, which would furthermore be salted with an ID that is unique to the scanning station, so every single scanning station would have a unique salt ID, or better yet a group of salt IDs that change depending on several factors, that would be added to the internal ID upon hashing and would produce the more secure resultant ID.

With how cheap FlashROM is now, it’d be great if they had an updatable internal mechanism for rotating keys for your personal ID (such as updating internal IDs whenever you renew your passport), as well as keeping an internal database of the salt IDs for all the stations so the salt ID wouldn’t have to be transmitted anywhere near as often, thus reducing risk of an attack on the hashing algorithm.

Also, since all of this hardware is going into these things, might as well build in an authentication mechanism so the e-passport doesn’t arbitrarily send out IDs where a differential attack may be observed, similar to how WEP was cracked.

But like I said, this would require a lot more hardware.  However, RFIDs are not really a good idea for important information.  Security, especially like this, needs to be taken seriously in this day and age and even if it’s not "cost effective", then don’t bother giving out a far less secure system that can endanger the privacy and identities of people.